There are ways to insert vulnerabilities that would look like ordinary bugs and be very hard to catch even when somebody is really looking in the source code (see how long it took people to figure out that Debian pseudorandom number generator was defunct). The problem of trust is there for both TrueCrypt and its closed-source alternatives such as BitLocker. If this is configured, then it is done so by a corporate group policy, but it is not ON by default.īitLocker does not allow plausible deniability on the other hand, and there people will need to find some other option now that TrueCrypt development seems to be ending. I use it, since TrueCrypt does not (and, probably, never will after the announcement) support UEFI partitions.Īlso, BitLocker does not, by default, leave a "backdoor" for domain admins. Since Windows 7 it allows a passphrase in pretty much the same way as TrueCrypt. ![]() ![]() Actually, BitLocker does >not<</a> require TPM since Windows 7.
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